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Abstract. This paper analyses two approaches to measuring market power
–the commonly used Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures–. It
is argued that the Lerner index is designed to quantify market power from
the supply side and the exploitation measures are designed to quantify market
power from the demand side, and that the two approaches do not always behave
in a symmetric way, since they do not always have the same bounds. To sort
out these potentially undesirable properties, this paper proposes a new general
index to measure market power, which is symmetrical in the sense that it is
bounded between zero and one, regardless of whether the market power comes
from the supply or the demand side. The index proposed allows for the presence
of more than one ﬁrm and for the existence of conjectural variations.
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JEL classiﬁcation: D49, L10, L11.
Resumen. Este documento analiza dos enfoques para medir poder de mercado
–el frecuentemente utilizado ´ ındice de Lerner y un conjunto de medidas de ex-
plotaci´ on–. Se argumenta que el´ ındice de Lerner est´ a dise˜ nado para cuantiﬁcar
el poder de mercado por el lado de la oferta y que las medidas de explotaci´ on
est´ an dise˜ nadas para cuantiﬁcar el poder de mercado por el lado de la de-
manda, y que esos dos enfoques no siempre tienen los mismos l´ ımites. Para
corregir estas propiedades potencialmente no deseables, este documento pro-
pone un nuevo ´ ındice general para medir poder de mercado, que es sim´ etrico
–estando restringido a valores entre cero y uno–, independientemente de si el
poder de mercado proviene del lado de la oferta o de la demanda. El´ ındice pro-
puesto permite la presencia de m´ as de una ﬁrma y la existencia de variaciones
conjeturales.
Palabras clave: poder de mercado, mark up, mark down, ´ ındice de Lerner,
medidas de explotaci´ on, organizaci´ on industrial, variaciones conjeturales.
Clasiﬁcaci´ on JEL: D49, L10, L11.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses two approaches to measuring market power –the com-
monly used Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures–, spelling out
the central features of the main indexes within each approach. It is argued that
the Lerner index is designed to quantify market power from the supply side
and the exploitation measures are designed to quantify market power from the
demand side, and that the two approaches do not always behave in a symmetric
way, since they do not always have the same bounds.
To sort out these potentially undesirable properties, this paper derives a
new general index to measure market power from proﬁt maximization, which
is symmetrical in the sense that it is bounded between zero and one, regardless
of whether the market power comes from the supply or the demand side. The
proposed index allows for the presence of more than one ﬁrm and for the
existence of conjectural variations.
The use of the proposed index should increase awareness of the existence
and measurement of market power from the supply and the demand side, while
making more expedite the use of such measures in empirical estimations, re-
gardless of the side of the market where the market power comes from.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the theoretical
framework in which the Lerner index and three alternative –and related– ex-
ploitation measures are derived from proﬁt maximization, describing the main
properties of each index. The following section proposes an index that over-
comes some of the limitations of the standard measures considered before. The
paper ends with the main conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
This section derives measures of market power from proﬁt maximization.
In order to make general statements, assume that there are n ﬁrms that play
Cournot to start with, and keep in mind that this assumption will be relaxed
later on through the introduction of a conjectural variations coeﬃcient. Assume
also that all ﬁrms have identical cost structures.
2.1. Market power from the supply side
When market power is generated from the supply side (with prices greater
than marginal costs, as in monopoly, monopolistic competition and –often–
oligopoly), ﬁrms apply a mark up. This case is shown in ﬁgure 1.
Consider the following proﬁt equation for a ﬁrm playing Cournot:
Πi = PG(qi + Q−i)qi − TCi,
where
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Figure 1. Market power from the supply side: monopoly, monopo-

















Πi = proﬁts of ﬁrm i,
PG = per unit price of the good produced by ﬁrm i,
qi = quantity produced by ﬁrm i,
Q−i = quantity produced by all ﬁrms in the market, except ﬁrm i,
Q = quantity produced by all ﬁrms in the market,
TCi = total costs of ﬁrm i.
Since all ﬁrms are assumed to have identical cost structures, the sub-index
i can be dropped. Proﬁt maximization with n ﬁrms implies that





Thus the Lerner index –proposed by Abba Lerner (1934)1– with n ﬁrms,









LH = Lerner index with more than one ﬁrm,
MgCG = marginal cost of producing the good,
H = Herﬁndahl market concentration index,






, the negative of the price elasticity of demand,












1This index has been criticized, among other reasons, because estimating it is complex,
since it is diﬃcult to obtain measures of marginal costs, and since prices may be aﬀected by
cyclical economic behaviour. Thus, in general, it is useful to think of the Lerner index –and
of market power quantiﬁcations in general– as measuring average mark up.






The Lerner index can also be adapted to the conjectural variations model










with 0 ≤ θ ≤
1
H
, such that if
θ = 0, players play Bertrand and price equals marginal costs;




, players play collusion or cartel.2
Recall that since marginal costs are non-negative and since proﬁt maxi-
mizing ﬁrms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs, such ﬁrms always
operate in the elastic region of the demand curve 1 ≤ η < ∞. Thus, in order
to evaluate the bounds of this index, consider the following:
If θ = 0, Lθ
H = 0.
If θ = n, the least upper bound of Lθ
H = 1, and








= 0 and, if η = 1, Lθ
H = 1. So, 0 ≤ Lθ
H ≤ 1.
In general, the n ﬁrms’ Lerner index with conjectural variations has the
following properties:
i. It is designed to measure market power from the supply side.
ii. It is bounded between zero and one.
iii. The index is zero when there is no market power (perfect competition).
iv. The maximum market power generates a value of one.
v. The index is increasing in market power.
Bresnahan (1989) reviews a vast literature on measuring market power and
provides a summary of Lerner index estimations, shown in appendix 1.
2In this case, players replicate monopoly power. θ = 1/H can also represent monopolistic
competition if each ﬁrm with diﬀerentiated products, faces the speciﬁc demand for its variety
as a monopolist.
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2.2. Market power from the demand side
This section derives measures of market power from the demand side (with
prices lower than marginal costs, as in monopsony, monopsonistic competition,
and –often– oligopsony), assuming that all ﬁrms have identical production func-
tions. This case, where ﬁrms apply a mark down, is shown in ﬁgure2.
Figure 2. Market power from the demand side: monopsony, monop-



















Consider the following proﬁt equation for a ﬁrm playing Cournot (taking
the demand of the factor or input by other ﬁrms as given):
Πi = PGQ(fi) − PF(fi + F−i)fi,
where
fi = amount of factor or input used by ﬁrm i,
PF = factor or input unit price,
F−i = total amount of factor or input used in the market, except for ﬁrm i,
F = total amount of factor or input used in the market,
and the rest of the variables are deﬁned as before.
Proﬁt maximization with n ﬁrms, implies that







MRPi = marginal revenue product of ﬁrm i,
MgCFi = the marginal cost to ﬁrm i, as a demander of an input.




















, the price elasticity of supply,
and all other variables are deﬁned as before.
Note that under proﬁt maximization with market power from the demand
side, the marginal revenue product is equal to the marginal cost, and recall that
by (1), s = H. Thus, from (3) it is possible to derive the following measures of
exploitation:
2.2.1. Pigou’s exploitation measure for n ﬁrms












PEM = Pigou’s exploitation measure,
PF = factor or input unit price.
This PEM for n ﬁrms can be adapted to the conjectural variations model












However, as opposed to the elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply
has the following characteristic:4
0 < ε < ∞.















= 0, ∀ θ > 0,
and so 1 ≤ PEM
θ
H < ∞.
In general, the n ﬁrms’ Pigou’s exploitation measure with conjectural vari-
ations has the following properties:
3In this case, with θ = 1/H, players replicate monopsony. θ = 1/H can also represent
monopsonistic competition if each ﬁrm with diﬀerentiated demand faces the supply of its
variety of demand as a monopsonist.
4Proﬁt maximization implies that MRP = MgCF. Since







proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms can operate on the elastic and the inelastic regions of the supply
curve.
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i. It is designed to measure market power from the demand side.
ii. The measure is increasing in market power.
iii. The measure is bounded by one when there is no market power (perfect
competition).
iv. The measure is unbounded as the market power rises.
2.2.2. Scully’s rate of monopsonistic exploitation for n ﬁrms
Scully’s (1974) rate of monopsonistic exploitation index for n ﬁrms can be
derived from proﬁt maximization as






















RME = rate of monopsonisitc exploitation,
and all the other variables are deﬁned as before.
This RMEH for n ﬁrms can be adapted to the conjectural variations model










































= 1, ∀ θ > 0,
and so 0 ≤ RME
θ
H ≤ 1.
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In general, the n ﬁrms’ RME with conjectural variations has the following
properties:
i. It is designed to measure market power from the demand side.
ii. It is bounded between zero and one.
iii. The index is increasing in market power.
iv. The index is zero when there is no market power (perfect competition).
v. The maximum market power generates a value of one.
2.2.3. Boal’s exploitation measure for n ﬁrms
Boal’s (1995) exploitation measure, generalized for n ﬁrms in Boal and
Ransom (1997), can be derived from proﬁt maximization as


















EH = Boal’s exploitation measure with more than one ﬁrm,
H = Herﬁndahl market concentration index,
ε = price elasticity of supply.
This exploitation measure for n ﬁrms can be adapted to the conjectural vari-
ations model by multiplying H in the index described in (4) by the conjectural












Since 0 ≤ ε < ∞, in order to identify the bounds of this index, consider the
following:
















= ∞, ∀ θ > 0,
and so 0 ≤ Eθ
H < ∞.
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In general, the n ﬁrms’ Boal’s exploitation measure with conjectural varia-
tions has the following properties:
i. It is designed to measure market power from the demand side.
ii. The index is increasing in market power.
iii. The index is zero when there is no market power (perfect competition).
iv. The index is unbounded as the market power rises.
Boal and Ransom (1997) collect information on a range of exploitation
measures and express them in terms of E, the Boal’s exploitation measure.
Such information is summarized in appendix 2.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that there is an asymmetry between the
Lerner index and the exploitation measures analyzed in this document, since
the Lerner index is designed to measure market power from the supply side,
while the exploitation measures are designed to quantify market power from
the demand side. Besides, the Lerner index is bounded for both increases and
decreases in market power, while the exploitation measures are not always
bounded for increases in market power.
3. The generalized index of market power
To sort out the potentially undesirable asymmetries of the Lerner index
and the exploitation measures, this paper proposes a Generalized Index of
Market Power GIMP, which is symmetrical and bounded between zero and
one, regardless of whether the market power comes from the supply or the






P = PG if market power comes from the supply side (P > MgC),
P = PF if market power comes from the supply side (P < MgC),
MgC = MgCG if market power comes from the supply side (P > MgC),
MgC = MgCF if market power comes from the supply side (P < MgC).
When market power comes from the supply side, the price is greater than






Thus, the microeconomic derivation and the properties of the GIMP when
market power comes from the supply side are the same as those of the Lerner
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, with 0 ≤ GIMP
θ
SS(H) ≤ 1.
When market power comes from the demand side, price is lower than






The microeconomic derivation and the properties of the GIMP when market
power comes from the demand side are the same as those of Scully’s rate
of monopsonistic exploitation RME. Besides, the GIMPDD with n ﬁrms and

















, with 0 ≤ GIMP
θ
DD(H) ≤ 1.
In general, the n ﬁrms’ GIMP index with conjectural variations has the
following properties:
i. It is designed to measure market power from supply or demand.
ii. It is bounded between zero and one.
iii. The index is increasing in market power.
iv. The index is zero when there is no market power (perfect competition).
v. The maximum market power generates a value of one.
The GIMP, as well as the best known indexes of market power used in
the literature, has not been designed –and is not particularly well suited– to
measure market power in the case of bilateral monopoly, as described in Pindyck
and Rubinfeld (2001). These limitations also apply to other circumstances, such
as the case of multisided markets –including the existence of non-internalized
network externalities– as described in Rochet and Tirole (2004).
A summary of the features of the market power measures analyzed in this
paper is presented in table 1.
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Table 1. Key features of the market power measures analyzed
4. Conclusions
This paper has analysed two approaches to measuring market power –the
commonly used Lerner index and a range of exploitation measures–. It has
argued that the Lerner index is designed to quantify market power from the
supply side, while the exploitation measures are designed to quantify market
power from the demand side, and that the two approaches do not always behave
in a symmetric way, since they do not have the same bounds.
To sort out these potentially undesirable properties, a new general index to
measure market power has been proposed, which is symmetrical in the sense
that it is bounded between zero and one, regardless of whether the market
power comes from the supply or the demand side. Besides, the proposed index
has been extended to be used when there are several ﬁrms in the market, and
to allow for conjectural variations. However, the index is not particularly well
suited to measure market power under some circumstances, for example the
existence of bilateral monopoly or of multisided markets.
References
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989). Empirical studies of industries with market power. In
Schmalensee, R., Willig, R. D. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Vol. 2. Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Boal, W. M. (1995). “Testing for employer monopsony in turn-of-the-century
coal mining”. The Rand Journal of Economics 26(3), 519–536.
Boal, W. M., Ranson, M. R. (1997). “Monopsony in the labor market”. Journal
of Economic Literature 35, 86–112.
Cabral (2000). Introduction to industrial organization. The MIT Press: Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
Lerner, A. (1934). “The concept of monopoly and the measurement of monopoly
power”. Review of Economic Studies 1(3), 157–175.
Pigou, A. C. (1924). The economics of welfare, 2nd. Ed. Macmillan and Co.:
London.
Pindyck, R., Rubinfeld, D. (2001). Microeconom´ ıa, 5th. Ed. Prentice Hall; 545.
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 10 (2): 95–108, diciembre de 2007106 A GENERALIZED INDEX OF MARKET POWER
Rochet, J. C., Tirole, J. (2004). Two-sided markets: an overview.
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochet tirole.pdf.
Scully, G. W. (1974). “Pay and performance in major league baseball”. The
American Economic Review 64(6), 915–930.
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 10 (2): 95–108, diciembre de 2007H. VALLEJO 107
Appendix 1
Summary of existing empirical work on the Lerner index
Author Industry Lerner index
Lopez (1984) Food processing 0.504
Roberts (1984) Coﬀee roasting 0.055/0.025 (a)
Appelbaum (1982) Rubber 0.049 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Textile 0.072 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Electrical machinery 0.198 (c)
Appelbaum (1982) Tobacco 0.648 (c)
Porter (1983) Railroads 0.40 (b)
Slade (1987) Retail gasoline 0.1
Bresnahan (1981) Automobiles (1970s) 0.10/0.34 (d)
Suslow (1986) Aluminum (interwar) 0.59
Spiller-Favaro (1984) Banks “before” (e) 0.88/0.21 (f)
Spiller-Favaro (1984) Banks “after” (e) 0.40/0.16 (f)
a. Largest and second largest ﬁrm, respectively.
b. When cartel was succeeding: 0 in reversionary periods.
c. At sample midpoint.
d. Varies by type of car; larger in standard, luxury segment.
e. Uruguayan banks before and after entry deregulation.
f. Large ﬁrms / small ﬁrms.
Source: Bresnahan (1989) p. 1051.
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